Xavier Dupret: « It may be in Iran that the end of Western hegemony will play out »

Publié le par Mohsen Abdelmoumen

Xavier Dupret. D.R.

Xavier Dupret. D.R.

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Mohsen Abdelmoumen: With the advent of AI and the widespread adoption of robotics, we are being warned of massive layoffs across all sectors, which will not be offset by the creation of more skilled jobs in new or specialized sectors, as was the case in previous crises. Do you think we are witnessing THE major crisis of capitalism or, worse, the culmination of the dream of Malthusian and eugenicist elites?

Xavier Dupret: Regarding the development of artificial intelligence, it is important to remain modest and nuanced in assessing the consequences of this wave of capital substituting for labor. It seems preferable to observe the impacts sector by sector as an exercise in discernment. However, this caution should not prevent us from diagnosing underlying trends. We can already anticipate that jobs in service sectors will be primarily threatened. Last year, the Financial Times estimated that over 200,000 jobs in the European banking sector could be automated by 2030. By 2025, artificial intelligence served as a foundational technological factor enabling the realization of several thousand corporate restructuring operations. These operations resulted in over one million layoffs in total, the highest level since the Covid crisis. This development, which neoliberal Western elites aim to impose in an uncontrolled and unregulated manner on workers worldwide, could pose a major macroeconomic problem. In line with Keynes, we can observe that job cuts may lead to imbalances between production and consumption. In economies as tertiary-focused as those of the United States or Western Europe, the economic weight of service sector workers is significant. In North America, white-collar workers represent 50% of employment and finance about 75% of consumer spending. The jobs that AI is destroying constitute the core of the American middle class. In the longer term, however, it remains difficult to provide a clear diagnosis. Nonetheless, we can foresee a trend toward increasing technological unemployment. The computerization of middle-class jobs is currently not offset by an equivalent creation of new jobs in the service sector. These jobs exist but not in sufficient numbers to replace the positions eliminated or to compensate for the resulting loss of income.

The tragedy of automation and computerization lies in the fact that information technologies enable the development of new activities but do not create as many paid jobs as they destroy. The proliferation of opinion blogs does not compensate for the decline of paid jobs in professional media. If we compare the volume of jobs created by information technologies to the volume of jobs eliminated and extrapolate existing trends over several decades, it becomes impossible for 70% of tomorrow’s global jobs to be programmers and software developers. This global perspective is important because we have yet to address the situation in emerging economies. In these economies, we do not see such a development of services. On the contrary, the question of industrialization on an autonomous, national, and sovereign basis constitutes an adequate response to the challenges we have described. This focus on the Global South is important because it highlights the underlying political shift corresponding to the rise of information technologies and the monopolistic capitalism that supports it, namely techno-fascism, reflecting the alliance between Silicon Valley and the reactionary right. This ideology, an unprecedented mix of libertarianism and an old fascist and neocolonial undercurrent that has always existed in major Western countries, aims to dismantle social policies with a chainsaw, leaving markets free to diffuse technological solutions that are hoped to revive productivity gains in North America and Western Europe. I hasten to add that I strongly oppose this technologist illusion. Indeed, the deindustrialization that has struck the West will not be halted because professional interpreters are replaced by interpretation software. Consequently, reclaiming productivity gains under these conditions is entirely illusory. That’s the technological aspect. However, we can fear that, in the long run, fascism will remain. Unfortunately, this fear is far from being a fantasy.

Alongside the impact of this technological revolution, many heterodox economists remind us that the crises of 2008 and the Covid pandemic have still not been resolved, and that governments are weakened by their budget deficits and massive levels of debt. Is the European model of capitalism, tempered by the welfare state, under threat from major demographic, technological and political trends?

I belong to this heterodox school of thought, and indeed, the figures have been far from impressive since our governments converted private debt into public debt following the bank failures of 2008, without, however, making the main beneficiaries of financial liberalisation since the 1980s – that is to say, the wealthiest 10% of the population – contribute. On the contrary, the quantitative easing policies of the ECB and the Fed have mainly benefited the financial markets and the most privileged tax households. The very low level of interest rates then transformed public debt into a cheap social lubricant. The Covid crisis was managed on the basis of these low interest rates. At the time, the ‘whatever it takes’ policy characterised the approach of the European authorities. The injection of cheap money helped to save domestic demand. Subsequently, the desynchronisation of value chains pushed up the level of inflation. This was accompanied by a significant tightening of interest rates. From 2022 onwards, the war in Ukraine has resulted, at least in Western Europe, in a significant rise in imported inflation linked to the rising cost of Russian gas imports. The impact on interest rates has been clear.

Since then, the interest burden on public debt (which relates solely to interest payments) has literally skyrocketed. For example, in Belgium (my country), this burden is set to rise from €12.2 billion to nearly €20.9 billion between 2026 and 2030. However, this situation must be put into perspective. Indeed, the real cost of debt, once the effect of inflation is factored in, has so far proved to be lower than the debt burden and has even been negative in recent years, precisely because interest rates have remained low for so long. For the time being, there is as yet no sign of a trend towards an increasing burden of liabilities within public finances leading to a ‘snowball’ effect. As a reminder, such an effect characterises a trajectory in which the interest burden automatically sustains itself, leading to a rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio even if the deficit is kept at its minimum level. It occurs when the average interest rate on the debt exceeds the rate of GDP growth. We are not yet at that stage, but in the future, if nothing is done to put public finances in order, this burden will grow to such an extent that a ‘snowball’ scenario cannot be ruled out.

However, the solution is by no means straightforward. Let us even dare to be a little counter-intuitive on this point. What if the problem with our public finances lay not in excessive spending but in a shortfall in revenue resulting from insufficient taxation of large fortunes and the upper and upper-middle classes? After all, when the Belgian state drastically reduced its public debt, bringing it down from over 130% of GDP in the early 1990s to nearly 95% in the mid-2000s, the tax system was far more progressive than it is today. On a different note, it is worth noting that in countries where it existed, the wealth tax has been dismantled. It is hardly surprising, under these circumstances, that our governments are cash-strapped.

It is, moreover, clear from this perspective, and here I see a link with the preceding question and the rise of fascism in the United States and in many European countries, that the discourse of the right places too heavy an emphasis on the fallacious theme of ‘the state being bankrupt’ in order to sacrifice the social-democratic model that served as the structural framework defining the Bismarckian branch of capitalism (also known as continental capitalism). This is a social attack disguised as armchair philosophy. Indeed, the economic fallout in Europe from the combined attack by Zionist and US forces against Iran clearly demonstrates that it is not the states that are making drastic cuts to their public finances.

Indeed, on the ECB side, German positions currently ensure that interest rates will not be touched as long as inflation forecasts remain anchored. If Trump fails to calm the situation or if he is too weakened after the midterms to prevent Netanyahu’s assaults, the scenario of oil at $150 a barrel is no longer a marginal hypothesis. We shall then see whether the Germans remain as lenient as ever on interest rates. It is worth noting that, in the face of rising inflation, government bond yields are already tightening across Europe. Yet it is these long-term rates set by the markets which, to put it simply, determine the cost of debt. On this subject, it must be noted that the yield spread between French and German debt remains tight. Spain, on the other hand, is holding up much better. The homeland of Cervantes, by pursuing a Keynesian demand-side policy and providing greater protection for the labour market (which involves legalising the residence of hundreds of thousands of migrant workers), is currently Europe’s growth champion. Madrid is expected to see 3% GDP growth this year. Growth driven by wages apparently pays off more than the axe. The rise in economic uncertainty does not, however, rule out the possibility of making different societal choices. It is therefore by no means a foregone conclusion that techno-fascism will win the day. After all, job losses in the private service sector can be offset by the expansion of public services, particularly in personal care, education and care for the elderly. On this point, let us not delude ourselves. It is still possible today to finance our welfare states. Under the onslaught of neoliberal policies, Belgian and French workers have lost the equivalent of 5 percentage points of GDP, corresponding to a decline in the share of wages in our countries’ GDP over the last thirty years. 5% of the wealth created in Europe could therefore be shifted back from capital to labour. It is a question of political will.

We are also witnessing a loss of confidence in free trade and international value chains, with a shift towards sovereignty, geographical withdrawal into more compact blocs, and a war economy – somewhat akin to the situation in Europe at the end of the 19th century, though this time with the formation of political and military alliances on a global scale. Is the world heading for self-destruction, as Europe did at the end of the 19th century, and is there still a role for the economy to mitigate these geopolitical tensions?

I would like, first of all, to clarify the terms of this debate. What we have termed ‘globalisation’ is an approximation and a conflation of distinct realities. In fact, globalised value chains reflect an internationalisation of trade that resumed at the end of the Second World War and intensified from the 1960s onwards.

When we speak of globalisation, we are, in reality, referring to a process consisting of an attempt to Americanise the world. To understand the specific nature of this process, it is important to focus on the issue of financial liberalisation, which has gradually accompanied the internationalisation of trade over the past fifty years or so. On closer inspection, it is perfectly possible to open up trade between two countries on a free-trade basis without necessarily accompanying this decision with the opening of the capital account. It is this financial dimension that characterises the hallmark of the post-Cold War pax Americana. By comparison, it can also be argued that China has capitalised on the globalisation of trade without, however, liberalising access to the foreign exchange surplus it has accumulated from its exports. Indeed, this restriction imposed on the US financial sector can be seen as a major bone of contention between Washington and Beijing. This is obviously not the only source of conflict between the two countries. In this regard, the desire of American industries to move upmarket is just as significant. One might, however, think that if China were to open its capital account to the appetites of Wall Street, it would very likely have fewer issues with Uncle Sam.

It so happens that since 2008, the US model of capitalism—which might be described as financialised neoliberalism—has been losing momentum quite markedly. This situation reinforces China’s drive towards autonomy, as it finds itself in a position to advance its agenda further on the international stage. China’s rise among the major powers is, moreover, breathtaking.

If one were to attempt to characterise the era we are living in from a geopolitical perspective, I would prefer to avoid comparisons with the past, which carry the unverifiable metaphysical assumption that history repeats itself. For my part, I favour a method that emphasises experimental concepts rather than general assumptions. I shall therefore frame the remainder of this analysis in the tradition of the economist Charles Kindleberger (1910–2003). In this regard, it cannot be emphasised enough that our era lacks leadership and coordination in the provision of global public goods. These refer to services or resources (monetary stability, trade rules) available to all states, but requiring cooperation for their provision. The least that can be said is that such coordination is lacking.

Kindleberger’s analysis should not, however, lead to a proliferation of flawed historical parallels. Kindleberger’s research sought to identify the roots of the economic and political instability that led to the Second World War. According to Kindleberger’s framework, the United States’ refusal to assume a hegemonic position in place of the United Kingdom, whose power was then in decline, would explain the rise of nationalism and the ensuing cataclysm in Europe. It must be acknowledged that this analysis fits well with the facts as they unfolded in the aftermath of the First World War. Following their decisive intervention on the European theatre of operations, the United States did indeed choose, from 1918 onwards, to refocus on the development of its industries, which had reached the stage of mass consumption. It is precisely on this point that the parallels between the 1930s and the current situation prove ineffective. Indeed, China wishes to take its role as a major power seriously by providing international public goods, and it is the United States that is preventing it from doing so, as evidenced by Washington’s obstruction of China’s participation in the functioning of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

For the past fifteen years or so, China’s rise to power has been accompanied by pressure from Beijing to hold a larger share of the IMF’s capital and thus position itself more firmly as a provider of international public goods. In these circumstances, one can only hope for the emergence of a multipolar world that will allow the Global South to exert greater influence on the international stage. In this context, the countries of the Global South are increasingly emerging as full-fledged actors in the reshaping of the international order.

For the time being, however, it must be acknowledged that the United States opposes this relative decline in its power. We are therefore facing a stalemate, with all the dangers that such a situation inevitably entails. Whilst Washington pursues an agenda of liberalising financial flows and foreign direct investment, China, for its part, emphasises the principles of sovereignty and the national right to development. As long as the world remains divided between two global power poles promoting such diametrically opposed approaches, clashes are likely to erupt across the globe. It is high time that Western nations finally realised that this planet does not revolve exclusively around their interests and ideological frameworks.

Does the European Union, which was built on economic integration, still have a purpose today, or should we return to the level of nation states? What is your vision for a country like Belgium?

A country like Belgium, which has already suffered so much from two world wars resulting from the struggle for political hegemony in Europe, can only hope for the establishment of consultation mechanisms in Europe. The question regarding European integration should, moreover, focus less on its very existence. After all, the fact that Europeans settle their differences through discussion within the European Council rather than on a battlefield represents a considerable step forward for humanity.

I make this observation bearing in mind a remark I often heard whilst living in Argentina: ‘European culture is very violent’. It is true that Europeans have committed more than one genocide in their history. This fact encourages us to view European integration more as an opportunity than as an obstacle.

In reality, it is the political substance of Europeanism that must be seriously called into question. First and foremost, if Europe truly wishes to be synonymous with peace, it is time for it to acknowledge the intrinsically criminal nature of colonialism. This starting point constitutes an absolutely essential moral and diplomatic imperative.

Secondly, we must not delude ourselves. Acknowledging past crimes will, of course, be necessary but by no means sufficient. It is also vital that Europe develops genuine partnerships on an equal footing with the African continent and, more broadly, the Global South. We are firmly expected to deliver on this front. From this perspective, European leaders must absolutely understand that the multipolarity taking shape represents an opportunity to be encouraged and supported—not with the attitude of a cantankerous mother-in-law, but in a spirit of fraternity and friendship between peoples. Europe would benefit from forging genuinely balanced relations with these regions, in a spirit of respect and cooperation, rather than limiting itself to its own interests. The idea of a European non-alignment that would reposition the Old Continent equidistant between Washington and Beijing is, from this perspective, a promising project: never again should the Old Continent serve merely as a rear base for NATO.

Finally, the neoliberal orientation of the European treaties must be challenged. The inward-looking dimension you highlighted in your question is not unrelated to the immense social setbacks we have witnessed over the past thirty years in Europe. During the 1980s, the European movement rode the wave of the challenge posed by the neoliberal currents in vogue at the time to state interventionism. Liberalisation from above was therefore imposed on the pretext that it was the European level that decided on it. In reality, a healthy sociological realism teaches us that the European political elites, whether working at national level or within the European institutions, were convinced of the validity of neoliberal principles.

Yet, as we have seen, these developments represent a groundswell that is bringing about the implementation of a model of accumulation through dispossession. The setbacks caused by this redeployment of capital are fuelling fascist, xenophobic and racist movements which, by undermining relations with the Global South, are jeopardising our shared future. Whilst millions of workers from the Global South keep the European economic machine running, it is inconceivable that these workers should remain deprived of the most basic rights simply because they do not have valid papers. It is telling, moreover, that the Spanish government, in keeping with its characteristic commitment to promoting workers’ rights, has opted for a mass regularisation of workers who had previously been forced to live in hiding.

It must, however, be acknowledged, with complete clarity, that current political directions are hardly moving in this direction. Whether it be the austerity treaties, cooperation with the Global South or servile subservience to Washington, European leaders seem to have chosen to live in the past. Their reluctance to condemn the aggression against Iran – widely contested under international law – bears cruel witness to this.

Ultimately, European unification will only retain its meaning if this political project, so recent, manages to move in the direction dictated by history; otherwise, it will be replaced by other structures. On this point, I am not among those who believe that a return to nation-states constitutes the alternative to the regressive stagnation described above. What weight do 11 million Belgians or 40 million Spaniards carry in the face of giants such as India or China? The old European nations are mere featherweights in the multipolar world of tomorrow. Consequently, groupings less imposing than the current European Union could succeed it. We are already seeing the first signs of this in the formation, for example, of the Nordic Council’s coordination forum in Scandinavia.

What does my country, Algeria – the Mecca of revolutionaries – mean to you?

This might come as something of a surprise to you, but I still describe myself today as a Third Worldist. Admittedly, this is rather rare for a man of my generation, and I have sometimes been teased a little for it in Europe. Nevertheless, this perspective favouring positive non-alignment – without rejecting anyone and whilst respecting sovereignty – remains the best approach to guaranteeing peace and the right to development. Current events prove, day after day, the validity of this doctrine.

Indeed, whilst rumours of war are rumbling all over the world at the moment, this is not, contrary to what the hegemonic Western media would have us believe, due to a clash of civilisations between the ‘good’ democrats of the North and the ‘bad’ dictatorships of the South. This situation, which is worrying in more ways than one, stems in fact from the fact that the United Nations doctrine, which recognises states rather than governments, is increasingly being trampled underfoot. It is true that the West still struggles to understand that the era of colonialism is definitively over. In this regard, the United States’ gunboat diplomacy in the Middle East constitutes a monumental error for which the West may well come to regret.

I also remember, of course, Algeria’s solidarity with all national liberation struggles around the world. I am all the more sensitive to this as I am Belgian. On this subject, one cannot emphasise enough the role played, in its own modest way, by the Northern Front in supporting Algerian independence. As a reminder, this Front refers to the solidarity movement involving Belgian citizens alongside the FLN during the war of independence. This network included ‘suitcase carriers’ providing logistical support to the liberation movement, as well as Belgian lawyers defending Algerian activists. This support also included press campaigns in favour of Algerian independence.

I would like to end this reply on a slightly more personal note. Algerian sovereignty, still disparaged in certain right-wing circles in France, is in no way accompanied by signs of chauvinism or isolationism. Proof of this is that one of the most beautiful squares in Algiers pays tribute to Maurice Audin. I had the chance to discover it recently and I hope to see it again one day. To be honest, I sometimes miss Algeria. The light at Place Audin really has something enchanting about it and, in any case, something unusual for a man from the north.

What does the struggle of the Sahrawi people mean to you?

This question provides a very interesting transition from the previous one. I have already had the opportunity to visit the camps twice: in 2020 with a group of journalists from across Europe, and in 2025 with the Belgian Committee for the Support of the Sahrawi People. I have also attended the proceedings of the Fourth Committee of the United Nations, which deals with decolonisation issues. Before going any further, I would like to highlight the Algerian government’s consistent and significant solidarity with the refugees settled near Tindouf. It is exemplary.

The more I think about it, the more it seems to me that the question of Western Sahara demonstrates the validity of the Algerian perspective on international relations. To be convinced of this, one need only look at the facts as they stand. In 1975, we had a colonised territory in Africa and a small people, the Sahrawis, fighting for their freedom. An advisory opinion from the United Nations International Court of Justice then recognised the inalienable right to self-determination of this territory, but just as Spain was preparing to turn the page on the Franco era, a former colonial power that had not given up on playing a role in Africa – France – literally armed the arm of its best client in the Maghreb, Morocco, and a war of invasion began. How can one not describe this situation as an example of the most vile and blatant neo-colonialism? How can one fail to see that the persistence of colonial attitudes still hinders development and peace in the world today? More broadly, decolonisation is not merely a question of borders: it is also a question of international justice.

From this perspective, it is clear that Europe has in no way distanced itself from Paris on this important issue. The attempts to conclude trade agreements with Morocco, against the repeated advice of the European courts, bear particularly eloquent witness to this. The Commission’s support for the Moroccan autonomy plan represents a continuation of the past. It cannot, however, be repeated often enough that this plan was devised in the offices of the Élysée under the leadership of Jacques Chirac. At the time, Paris was seeking to circumvent the implementation of the Baker Plan, which aimed to organise a referendum on self-determination. It is clear that had this referendum taken place in the early 1990s, Western Sahara would today be independent and sovereign. Neocolonialism and democracy are decidedly at odds with one another.

In any case, the Sahrawi people’s struggle for freedom will continue under the leadership of the Polisario, their sole legitimate representative, and the bluster from Paris or the Makhzen will change nothing. When one visits the camps, this determination is, moreover, palpable. Looking ahead, I am willing to bet that the Sahrawi struggle for independence will take on a symbolic and absolutely unavoidable dimension. Indeed, how is it possible that in 2026 there will still be a colony in Africa covering an area three times the size of Portugal? The more time passes, the more this issue—which remains a nagging concern today—will return to the forefront.

In this regard, Morocco’s strategy of attrition and fait accompli could backfire on Rabat. In the shorter term, we will soon see whether Donald Trump still has a majority in both houses of Congress following the November elections. Should Trumpism suffer a serious defeat in November, Washington’s support will carry less political weight. The European press, which only yesterday hailed a so-called ‘diplomatic victory’ for Morocco, will have to rethink its position. We can only recommend that in future it listen more closely to the voice of Algiers regarding the Sahrawi issue.

What is your view on the imperialist attack by Trump and Netanyahu against Iran?

Imperialism represents the military manifestation of neo-colonialism in its most direct and brutal form. This is nothing new in the history of international relations.

However, there is a political and ideological factor that alters this picture in the case of the attack on Iran. Usually, when the United States decides to take on a government that is defiant of what Washington considers to be the norm in international relations, pressure is brought to bear on the United Nations. Immediately, the major media groups serving the oligarchy take up the cause and set about inventing an international community which, as if by chance, aligns itself with Washington’s message. And if lies need to be spread—such as the claims of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction before the outbreak of the Second Gulf War—US diplomacy will do so without shame. That said, this concern to demonstrate the legitimacy of an operation, however fictitious, revealed a demand for formality on Washington’s part. This desire to observe the proper procedures ultimately corresponded to a desire to create law, in the manner of a defendant who lies to defend himself.

It is precisely at this level that we can identify a shift currently taking place under Donald Trump’s leadership. The joint intervention of the Zionist bloc and the US military has never been debated within the UN. This point deserves to be highlighted. International law has been deliberately sidelined by the Trump administration. This represents an unprecedented break. Their alignment with the practices of the Zionist entity, which are deeply reprehensible from the perspective of international law, is now evident.

This worrying shift corresponds to a process of radicalisation on the right of the US political scene. The parallels between the MAGA movement and the fascist militias active in Europe during the interwar period are well known and well documented. This authoritarian radicalisation has clearly fostered a rapprochement with the far-right of the Zionist entity, embodied, in such a sinister manner, by Benjamin Netanyahu.

Fascism does not fall from the sky. It is the reaction of a decadent power faced with its own limitations. This is precisely what is currently unfolding in Iran. Despite all the sanctions Tehran has been subjected to since 1979, Iran is on the verge of closing the strategic gap with the Zionist entity. The anxiety within Zionist circles, both in Washington and Tel Aviv, is evident. This psychological factor helps explain the violence of the reaction.

Moreover, it may well be in Iran that the end of Western hegemony—and more specifically US hegemony—will play out, a process whose starting point can be traced back to the great financial crisis of 2008. In any case, it is worth highlighting Iran’s military might, whether in terms of its drones or the strike capability of its missiles. We really must take Iran seriously when it says it is not afraid of a long war. It seems to me that this factor has been underestimated by the West.

What explains the United States’ unconditional support for the Zionist entity of Israel in its ongoing genocide of the Palestinian people in Gaza and in its war against Iran?

A nuanced answer to this question requires an analysis on two levels. Traditionally, there has been a close relationship between Washington and the Zionist entity. This collusion can be explained by a series of structural factors that have profoundly shaped both domestic politics in the United States and the architecture of international relations. The American political system is characterised less by ideological clashes than by a juxtaposition of diverse sociological realities, giving rise to a sort of ‘struggle for influence’ linked to the existence of various lobbies, some of which correspond to specific communities. It is at this level that a pro-Zionist lobby operates in the United States.

It would, moreover, be wrong to identify this pressure group solely with American citizens of the Jewish faith. Indeed, millenarian evangelical sects actively support the reactionary circles of the Zionist entity, whilst anti-Zionist American Jews (one thinks in particular of Norman Finkelstein) oppose colonialism in Palestine. On a broader geopolitical level, we must also highlight the importance of the Cold War as a factor that cemented the alliance between Washington and the Zionist entity. Faced with a Soviet Union that supported national liberation movements in the Arab world and the rise of the Non-Aligned Movement, the United States prioritised a rapprochement with Tel Aviv.

US hegemony is now drawing to a close, and Washington is aligning itself with the Zionist entity’s aggressive policy, in line with Netanyahu’s neo-colonial and fascist ideology. On an ideological level, this strengthened collaboration reflects a reinforcement of the Zionist entity’s role as the West’s bridgehead in the Near and Middle East. China’s rise in the region is a source of grave concern for Washington. However, as Iran is an ally of Beijing in the region, the conflict against Iran can be seen as a proxy conflict with China.

The war against Iran constitutes a power play against the emergence of a multipolar world. This attempt, apart from the damage it causes to the global economy, is, moreover, a rearguard action. Indeed, there is insufficient realisation of China’s incredible rise to power in barely two generations. Since the start of the century, of the billion people lifted out of poverty worldwide, 800 million are Chinese.

On a personal note, and to conclude, I am one of those Europeans who wish to collaborate more closely with China. Beijing’s brilliant economic success proves that it is possible to increase a continent’s prosperity without bowing to the dictates of Wall Street. For the welfare states of the Old Continent, this is, of course, a most encouraging prospect.

Interview by Mohsen Abdelmoumen

Xavier Dupret is a Belgian economist, journalist and teacher. His areas of expertise include the international economy, emerging economies and the dynamics of the crisis in capitalism. He is the author of several books on these subjects. He regularly contributes to various Belgian print and broadcast media (La Libre Belgique, LN24, RTBF, L’Echo, Le Soir, Démocratie, the magazine Nouvelle…) and international outlets (Le Courrier de Genève, Radio Nacional Argentina, Het Financieele Dagblad). He is an active campaigner for the independence of Western Sahara.

Published in French in Algeriepatriotique and in La Nouvelle République

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